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Summary
The premotor and parietal mirror neuron system (MNS)
is thought to contribute to the understanding of ob-
served actions by mapping them onto ‘‘correspond-
ing’’ motor programs of the observer [1–24], but how
would the MNS respond to the observation of hand ac-
tions if the observer never had hands? Would it not
show changes of blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) signal, because the observer lacks motor pro-
grams that can resonate [12, 25, 26], or would it show
significant changes because the observer has motor
programs for the foot or mouth with corresponding
goals [15, 17, 19, 27, 28]? We scanned two aplasic sub-
jects, born without arms or hands, while they watched
hand actions and compared their brain activity with
that of 16 control subjects. All subjects additionally ex-
ecuted actions with different effectors (feet, mouth,
and, for controls, hands). The BOLD signal of aplasic
individuals within the putative MNS was augmented
when they watched hand actions, demonstrating the
brain’s capacity to mirror actions that deviate from
the embodiment of the observer by recruiting voxels
involved in the execution of actions that achieve
*Correspondence: c.m.keysers@rug.nlcorresponding goals by different effectors. This sheds
light on the functional organization of the MNS and
predominance of goals in imitation.
Results and Discussion
A detailed description of the experiments can be found
in the Supplemental Data available online. In brief, two
aplasic and 16 typically developed (TD) individuals par-
ticipated in two functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) experiments. In the first, they observed movies of
hands manipulating various objects (HandAction, e.g.,
grasping a cocktail glass or scooping soup out of
a bowl) as well as static images of the hands resting
behind the same objects (HandStatic). In the second
experiment, all participants were asked to manipulate
an object with their lips (MouthExe), their toes (FootExe),
or, for the typically developed individuals, their hands
(HandExe). The execution experiment was always per-
formed after the observation to avoid biasing visual
activations toward motor areas.
We initially contrasted the brain activity resulting from
viewing the hand actions against the activity resulting
from viewing the static hand and object (HandAction-
HandStatic; Figure 1). Both aplasic subjects and the
typically developed (TD) controls activated, during ac-
tion observation, a bilateral circuit composed mainly of
frontal, parietal, and temporal clusters corresponding
to that reported in the literature [4, 7, 10–13, 15, 18, 19,
29] (Figure 1B and Table S1; all results also survived
FDR correction even at 0.005 over the entire brain). No
significant differences were found between the two
aplasic subjects and the 16 TD participants (two-sample
t test, voxel-by-voxel, with a very lenient threshold of
p < 0.5 FDR corrected), suggesting that the visual activa-
tion in the aplasic subjects were in the range of normal
variability. A graphical comparison of the activation pat-
terns of the 16 TDs (Figure S1) reveals substantial varia-
tion in the location and extent of visual activations. The
brain activity of the two aplasic individuals fell within
the range of this variability, with some TDs showing
relatively less and others more activations.
The classical definition of the MNS requires an overlap
of brain activations related to the observation of an ac-
tion and the execution of a similar action [1, 11, 17,
18]. For the TD group, we therefore inclusively masked
the visual contrast HandAction-HandStatic with the
brain activation elicited during the execution of hand
actions (Figure 2, lower right) and thus found a bilateral
putative mirror circuit composed of frontal (BA6, SFG/
MFG, preCG, and left BA44), parietal (SI, SII, SPL, and
the supramarginal gyrus of the inferior parietal lobule),
and temporal (MTG/ITG) cortices (see Table S3). Half
of the TDs had voxels involved during observation and
execution also in mesial BA6 (MNI: x = 0, y = 6, and z =
54) in locations considered to belong to the supplemen-
tary and presupplementary motor cortex. This supports
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1236Figure 1. Design and Results of the Visual Experiment
(A) Experimental stimuli and design during action observation. Four video clips from the HandAction or the HandStatic category formed a block.
(B) Activations during action observation. The upper four renders show the activations resulting from the contrast HandAction-HandStatic for
the two aplasic subjects (APL1 and APL2), and the lowest two show the activations resulting from the contrast HandAction-HandStatic for
the typically developed individuals (TDs). All activations are rendered on the average anatomy of all 18 subjects (16 TDs + 2 APL, punc < 0.001
and pFDR < 0.05).the idea that these regions may also be part of the
human MNS [30].
In aplasic subjects, masking with activation maps
related to hand execution is obviously impossible. In
their seminal work, Gallese and coworkers [1] described
that the most frequent subtype of mirror neurons
(‘‘broadly congruent’’) often responded during the exe-
cution of an action with a particular effector (e.g., grasp-
ing with the hand) and during the observation of a similar
action performed by the same or a different effector
(e.g., grasping with the hand or the mouth). Voxels that
are active during the observation of manipulative hand
actions and during the execution of manipulative foot
or mouth actions should therefore also be considered
to be part of the MNS. We therefore used brain activation
during foot or mouth execution (Figure 2, upper left) to
examine whether the vision of hand actions recruited
the putative MNS in aplasic subjects. For comparison,
we also masked the data of the TD group with their brain
activations during foot or mouth execution (Figure 2,
lower left). In all cases, fronto-parieto-temporal areas
were activated both during observation and execution,
suggesting the existence of a MNS for observed hand
actions also in aplasic subjects (Tables S2 and S3). In
the same TD group, we also contrasted the vision of
hand actions with the vision of meaningless hand
movements not involving manipulations [28]. Results
indicated that this fronto-parieto-temporal system
responds significantly more to the observation of ma-
nipulation than other biological motion (hand move-
ments not involving an object), supporting the interpre-
tation of these areas as part of the MNS [28]. In addition,to examine whether the vision of hand actions in aplasic
individuals recruited regions that in TDs would respond
during the execution of hand actions, we also masked
the visual activations in aplasic individuals with the
hand execution data of the TDs (Figure 2, upper right).
To directly compare the amplitude of mirror activa-
tions in aplasics and TDs, we extracted the BOLD signal
for the contrast HandAction-HandStatic in the putative
mirror regions of the TDs (Figure 3). In all regions (pre-
motor, parietal, and temporal) the contrast values of
the two aplasics fell between the first and third quartile
of the TDs; i.e., in these regions at least four of the TDs
showed less and four more activations than the aplasic
individuals. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test,
examining the rank order of the aplasic individual’s con-
trasts within the distribution of all 18 subjects, identified
no evidence for hypoactivation in aplasic individuals (all
p > 0.39). This indicates that, at least within the putative
MNS, the lack of significant differences observed with
the voxel-wise two-sample t test was not because of
a lack of statistical power. By defining the mirror regions
on the TDs, this test was systematically biased in favor
of the TDs and thereby strengthened the significance
of the absence of hypoactivation in the aplasics.
To examine the nature of the motor programs acti-
vated by the sight of hand actions, we differentiated, in
both TDs and aplasics, putative mirror areas that during
execution were selective for a particular effector from
those that were not (see Motor Decomposition and
Characterization of Visual Activations in the Supplemen-
tal Data and Figure S2). While viewing hand actions,
both TDs and aplasics activated a combination of
Overcoming Differences in Embodiment
1237Figure 2. Putative Mirror System for Actions
The left two columns show putative hand MNS for aplasic subjects (APL1 and APL2) and typically developed individuals (TD), defined by inclu-
sively masking the visual contrast HandAction-HandStatic with their FeetExecution or MouthExecution. The right two columns show the same
but defined by masking with TD’s HandExecution. For APL1-2, activations are rendered on the individual’s own anatomy, and for TDs, activations
are rendered on the average anatomy of the 16TDs (punc < 0.001 for the visual and motor contrast separately, and pfdr < 0.05 applied after
inclusively masking observation by execution).effector-unspecific areas and regions devoted to the
effector that the observer would use to perform the
observed action: the hand for TDs and the foot or mouth
for aplasics.
Our main finding that during the observation of hand
actions both aplasic individuals robustly activated re-
gions generally attributed to the MNS [1, 4, 6, 8–11, 15,
16, 18, 20, 21, 23] and involved in the execution of foot
or mouth actions has important implications for our
understanding of the MNS.
As pointed out in the introduction, the MNS is gener-
ally assumed to associate observed actions with ‘‘corre-
sponding’’ motor programs of the observer [1–24]. What
though is exactly meant by ‘‘corresponding’’? Two as-
pects of actions can be distinguished: their goals and
their means. If I remove the cap of a fountain pen with
my mouth, my hands, or my toes, the goal of the action
(i.e., what is being immediately achieved) remains the
same (‘‘removing the cap’’), whereas the means (i.e.,
effector and kinematics) used to achieve this goal differ.
This pragmatic definition of goal does not necessarily
refer to a further purpose (e.g., removing the cap to write
a love letter) or sense of intentionality. Distinguishing
goals and means raises the question of whether the
MNS associates observed actions with (1) motor pro-
grams for corresponding goals, (2) for corresponding
means, or (3) a combination of (1) and (2).In the monkey, the MNS is composed of at least two
types of mirror neurons: ‘‘strictly congruent’’ mirror neu-
rons (scMNs), which only respond to the sight of an
action if it has the same goal and uses the same effector
as the effective executed action, and ‘‘broadly congru-
ent’’ mirror neurons (bcMNs), which also respond when
the observed action involves a different effector—as
long as it has the same goal. Such bcMNs may respond
during the execution of grasping with the hand and dur-
ing the observation of grasping with the hand (same
goal, same effector) or the mouth (same goal, different
effector) but not during the vision of placing with the
hand (different goal, same effector) [1, 9]. The bcMNs
are approximately twice as abundant as the scMNs in
the monkey [1]. Jointly, in the monkey, bcMNs and
scMNs thus associate observed actions with a combina-
tion of actions with corresponding goals and means and
action with corresponding goals but dissimilar means.
The human MNS literature, in contrast, seduced by the
potential contribution of the MNS for imitation [4, 7, 11,
22, 31–39], has focused onto the capacity of the MNS
to associate observed actions with motor programs cor-
responding in terms of both means and goals. Concepts
such as ‘‘direct matching’’ [4, 7] or ‘‘motor resonance’’
[22] reflect this focus, and experiments that show that
the sight of actions performed with different effectors
specifically recruit cortex regions that are involved in
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26] have fueled this focus to the point where goal match-
ing had almost been forgotten.
Our main finding that both aplasic individuals robustly
activate regions involved in mouth and foot execution
provides direct evidence for the potential of goal match-
ing to recruit the putative MNS even in the absence of
a matching effector. Broadly congruent MNs similar to
those found in monkeys could provide the neural sub-
strate for this goal matching.
Evolutionary, what counts is achieving goals: If you
are hungry, being capable of opening a nut matters; do-
ing so by using your teeth or a stone does not. Indeed,
young children tend to imitate the goal not the way in
which an action is performed, unless the instructions
clearly ask for that [27, 40–42]. In addition, when we ob-
serve other individuals, differences between the details
of our bodies always introduce disparities between
observed and executed actions. Overcoming such
disparities, of which aplasia can be considered an
extreme example, may be the evolutionary necessity
that leads the MNS to also match goals of actions in
an effector-independent fashion. A number of recent
experiments on the mirror [5, 15, 17, 19, 28] and motor
systems [43] agrees with this interpretation.
Figure 3. Visual Activations in the Putative MNS
The render shows the location of the three regions of interest derived
from Figure 2 (right bottom row, HandAction-HandStatic inclusively
masked with HandExe for TDs). In each case, the right and left re-
gions of interest were combined. For each region, the graph plots
the value of the observation contrast (HandAction-HandStatic) for
each TD subject as a cross in the left column and for the two aplasics
as a circle and a square in the right column. The dashes in the middle
column represent the first, second (median), and third quartile of the
TDs. Two sided, nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test comparing the
contrast values of the TDs and aplasics had probabilities of p > 0.67,
p > 0.88, and p > 0.39 for the midtemporal, premotor, and parietal
cluster, respectively, showing that there is no evidence for hypoac-
tivation of the mirror system in aplasic individuals.How may the brain of aplasic individuals have devel-
oped the capacity to associate motor programs of the
foot or mouth with the vision of hand actions? A specu-
lative possibility is that aplasic individuals often interact
with TDs, and during joint actions, the hand actions of
the TDs would often occur in synchrony with the foot
and, to a lesser extent, the mouth actions of the aplasic
individuals. This synchrony could have lead to the en-
hancement of Hebbian associations between the sight
of hand actions and motor programs for corresponding
mouth or foot actions [20, 44].
A secondary finding of our study is that the amplitude
of the putative MNS activations in the aplasic individuals
during observation was within the range of normal vari-
ability in the TDs. If the activations of aplasic individuals
within the putative MNS would have fallen within the
lower quartile of the TDs’ activations, this lack of signif-
icant differences would have been simply attributable to
a lack of statistical power. Instead, the activations of
both aplasic individuals fell within the center two quar-
tiles of the TDs range, suggesting that a lack of power
was not the reason for our negative finding. By itself,
this negative finding, as with any negative finding, has
to be interpreted with care; it does not prove that the
average amplitude or spatial distribution of the visual
activations within the aplasic individuals was equal to
that of the TDs but simply shows that the difference
between these patterns was small compared to the
variance between the subjects.
In a separate experiment, the same TDs [28] were
shown movies of (1) a human and (2) an industrial robot
performing the same actions. During the vision of human
actions, TDs have motor programs that match both in
terms of means and goals, whereas during the vision
of robotic actions, they only have motor programs with
corresponding goals: Robotic actions differ in terms of
effector (robotic claw versus human hand) and kinemat-
ics from motor programs TDs would use to perform
these actions. The contrast HumanAction-RobotActions
should thus quantify the amount of effector-specific
motor programs that the putative MNS recruits during
the vision of hand actions and be conceptually similar
to the contrast between aplasic individuals and TDs in
the present experiment. In agreement with the aplasic
data, we found robust activations to the sight of actions
for which the observer had no directly matching effector
(RobotAction) in regions involved in the execution of
hand actions in all our 16 TDs, and there was again no
significant differences between the observation of
actions with and without matching effector (Human—
RoboticActions) within the putative MNS. Jointly, the
lack of significant differences in both experiments
indicates that when you observe actions of which you
have achieved the goal yourself in the past, you will
recruit your MNS to a ‘‘similar’’ degree whether your
body includes the observed effector or not; by similar,
we mean that if differences exist, they are small
compared to interindividual differences within the
population.
The emphasis on goals in our study is in apparent con-
trast with the observation of somatotopy in the MNS [6,
13, 18]. Why, if goals are so important, do we activate
more dorsal sectors of the premotor cortex while listen-
ing to hand actions and more ventral sectors while
Overcoming Differences in Embodiment
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[1], the human MNS is likely to perform both goal and
effector matching. In addition, goal matching does not
preclude the recruitment of effector-specific motor
programs. As evidenced in the case of aplasia, effec-
tor-specific motor programs (for the foot or mouth) are
indeed recruited, even though the observer lacks the
effector used by the observer. These recruited effec-
tor-specific programs may reflect the response of
bcMNs that match the goal of observed actions onto
whatever effector that the observer would use to per-
form these actions. What is remarkable in aplasia is
that this most probable effector is not the one they
most often see other people use to achieve the same
goals. In this case, the activations therefore cannot be
explained by a direct matching of the observed effector
onto the corresponding effector (effector-effector
route), and the data suggest the presence of a route
mediate by the existence of other actions that achieve
the same goal (effector-goal-effector route). In all exper-
iments on somatotopy so far, this mismatch was not
present [6, 13, 18]: Participants viewed or heard actions
performed by the same effector that they would most
probably use to perform these actions, and the pro-
posed effector-goal-effector route would then activate
the same effector-specific motor programs as a direct
effector-effector route, thereby also contributing to the
observed somatotopy. Experiments in which subjects
observe actions performed by unusual effectors would
help dissociate the contribution of the two pathways
to somatotopy [18].
In the context of the role attributed to the MNS in im-
itation and learning [15], the idea that the observation of
an action also recruits motor programs of actions with
corresponding goals but differing means endows the
observer with the flexibility of mapping the observed ac-
tion onto the behavioral alternative that is most suited
under his present circumstances. It resolves a long-
standing enigma: Why do monkeys not imitate despite
the presence of a mirror neuron system? If the MNS
also matches goals on goals, one would expect individ-
uals to learn to reach goals without necessarily imitating
the way in which the goals are achieved. Recent primate
studies demonstrate the fact that monkeys indeed learn
to reach goals by observation [45]. ‘‘True imitation’’ then
becomes a relatively rare, although sometimes impor-
tant, phenomenon linked to the minority of strictly
congruent neurons that closely match the details of
observed and executed actions. In human infants and
possibly monkeys [46], such imitation is possible but
may require appropriate instructions and training [27,
40, 47]. One could thus think of motor execution follow-
ing learning by observation as a competition between
the motor alternatives that the combination of scMN
and bcMN activate during observation. Without specific
instructions, this competition will lead to execution of
the most economical alternative, which might often
only have the goal in common with the observed action.
If infants or monkeys were instructed to imitate the
details of the actions, or if detailed imitation is the only
way to reach the observed goal (e.g., producing intricate
stone tools), this competition would be biased toward
motor programs with matching means, possibly by
enhancing the response of scMN.Finally, these findings provide direct evidence for the
long-standing question of how we could comprehend
actions that we never performed ourselves; contrary to
what has been assumed [25], if the goal of the observed
actions relate to goals that are part of our motor vocab-
ulary, we may comprehend them through the mirror of
our own actions.
Supplemental Data
Experimental Procedures, two figures, and four tables are available
at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/17/14/1235/
DC1/.
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